Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Mabey v. Wade : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. Shane Smith; Douglas R. Short; Smith & Hanna.
James I. Watt; Diana J. Huntsman; Mangum & Holt.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Mabey v. Wade, No. 930339 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5237

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U't.." p i G O 6 / ^ f?w

:

.:-

£^F^

L

i <

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS *

-Cfit
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT
Appellee/Petitioner,

vs.

Appeal No. 940339-CA
Trial Court No. 920012860CV

STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B.
WADE,
Appellants/Respondent.

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Attorneys for Respondent:

Attorneys for Petitioner:

JAMES I. WATTS
Attorney-at-Law
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

M. SHANE SMITH
DOUGLAS R. SHORT
SMITH & HANNA
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DIANA J. HUNTSMAN
MANGUM & HOLT
431 South 300 East, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 2 8 1994
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

<

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT
Appellee/Petitioner,

vs.

Appeal No. 940339-CA
Trial Court No. 920012860CV

STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B.
WADE,
Appellants/Respondent.

REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

Attorneys for Respondent:

Attorneys for Petitioner:

JAMES I. WATTS
Attorney-at-Law
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

M. SHANE SMITH
DOUGLAS R. SHORT
SMITH & HANNA
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DIANA J. HUNTSMAN
MANGUM & HOLT
431 South 300 East, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT
I.

II.

III.

APPELLANT/RESPONDENT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS,
BROUGHT FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELAY, OR IN
VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OR 34 OF THE RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

3

THE APPELLEE/PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 24A(9) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

6

APPELLEE ASSERTS THAT A WRITTEN CONTRACT
EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES,
AND THAT THE
CONTRACT SUPPORTS AN AWARD 01 I t IS

8

CONCLUSION

9

ATTACHMENTS
A.

CERTIFICATE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL DATED AUGUST 13, 1993

B.

CERTIFICATE OF READINESS FOR TRIAL DATED AUGUST 24, 1993

C.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

D.

PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM

E.

STATEMENT OF FACTS (AS CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S
SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM)

F.

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

G.

CONTRACT

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)

4

Hinckley v. Hinckley. 815 P.2d 1352; 167 Utah Adv. Rept. 16,

4

Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465; 123 Utah Adv. Rept. 31

4

Wasatch Bank vs. Leanv. 727 P.2d 633; 44 Utah Adv. Rept. 22, at 23 . . .

4

Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193; 188 Utah Adv. Rept. 26 at 29

5

Darrinaton v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1992)

5

English v. Standard Optical. 164 Utah Adv. Rept. 41 at 44,
(Utah App. 1991)

7

STATUTES

RULES
Rule 24A(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

6

Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

6

Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

6

iii

INTRODUCTION
This matter arises from the Court of Appeals' Memorandum of Decision
affirming the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment,
which Appellant brought pursuant to Rule 60b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Memorandum Decision was rendered on the 7th day of September, 1994. The
Memorandum Decision affirming the Trial Court's denial of the Appellate's 60b Motion
did not award to the Appellee costs or fees incurred in the appeal. Appellee has
requested a Petition for a Rehearing on the specific issue of awarding those fees.
Appellee apparently filed with the Court on September 12th, 1994 a Motion for
Extension of Time to respond to the summary disposition, which Motion the Court
granted on September 15th, 1994, granting the parties until September 26th, 1994
to respond to the Notice of Consideration of Summary Disposition. Appellants have
never received the Appellee's September 12th Motion requesting additional time,
however Appellant did receive on September 22nd, 1994 the Appellee's Motion to
Extend Filing of Petition for Rehearing and a Petition for Reconsideration, which was
received in an unbound form on the 18th day of September, 1994, then followed in
bound form on the 23rd day of September, 1994.

1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant objects to the request of Appellee that he be awarded attorneys fees
incurred in defending the appeal filed by Appellant of the Trial Court's denial of
Appellant's 60b Motion for the reason that Appellee has failed to establish a legal
basis for awarding of fees, which Appellee alleges should be awarded on one of the
following theories:
1.

That the appeal, as filed, was frivolous, or

2.

That the appeal was brought for the purposes of delay, or

3.

That a contract between the parties provided for attorneys fees, and

4.

That Petitioner was awarded attorneys fees at the trial level.

Appellant contends that the appeal is and was justified, raised valid issues of
fact and law for review by the Court. Appellant's assertion that this action is founded
upon a contract directly contradicts the facts asserted at the trial level. Appellee,
throughout the discovery process and beyond alleged the contract between the parties
was oral.
Appellant further asserts that Appellee has not complied w i t h Rule 24A(9) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires the Appellant to set forth the
contentions and reasons of the appeal w i t h respect to the issues presented, w i t h
citations to the authorities, statutes and the parts of the record relied upon,

the

Appellee has not done this, but merely made a one paragraph plea as part of its
petition.

2

Further, contrary to the assertion of the Appellee/Petitioner herein the Trial
Court denied the request for award of attorneys fees on the specific issue which is the
subject of this appeal, the denial of the Motion to Set Aside Default.
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Appellant/Respondent requests that the
Court deny the Appellee/Petitioner's request for a modification of the Memorandum
Decision to include an award of attorneys fees. That the Appellant/Respondent herein
be awarded costs and fees for that portion of the appeal pertaining to the Petition for
Rehearing, inasmuch as the assertions made by Petitioner/Appellee herein are
fallacious, not supported by the record, and in all respects violates of Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT

I.

APPELLANT/RESPONDENT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS, BROUGHT FOR THE
PURPOSE OF DELAY, OR IN VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OR 34 OF THE RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

Appellant objects to the request of Appellee that he be awarded attorneys fees
in defending this Appeal for the reason that the appeal was not frivolous or brought
for the purpose of delay.
The Appellee, in its Petition for Rehearing asserts that the appeal, as filed, was
both frivolous and done for the purpose of delay. Rule 33A of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure allows for an award of costs and fees and may include an order
of double costs if the appeal is deemed to be frivolous. A frivolous appeal is defined
by the Rule as,

3

"An appeal, motion, brief or other paper which is one that
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based upon a good faith argument to extend to or
modify a reverse existing law."
"Delay" is likewise defined by Rule 33 as,
"A motion or brief filed for an improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause needless increase in costs, litigation or gain
time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal,
motion, brief or other paper."
It is a well settled principle of Utah Law that sanctions for the bringing of an
appeal,

"... should only be applied in egregious cases, less there be
an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower
court decisions."
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)

The Porco reasoning and holding has been affirmed by a long littney of cases and
authorities, to included Hincklevv. Hincklev, 81 5 P.2d 1352; 167 Utah Adv. Rept. 16,
and Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465; 123 Utah Adv. Rept. 3 1 .
The Appellee apparently wishes this Court to adopt a position that because the
Court of Appeals intends to affirm the trial court's decision that it follow inter alia, that
the appeal was "frivolous" or "brought for delay." The Utah Supreme Court, in the
case of Wasatch Bank vs. Leanv, 727 P.2d 633; 44 Utah Adv. Rept. 22, at 23, in
which it offered a trial court's award of a deficiency judgment that,

4

"Even when an appeal is without merit, it does not follow
that it was 'frivolous' or brought 'for delay'".
(At page 23)
In the case of Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193; 188 Utah Adv. Rept. 26 at 29,
quoting from Hinckley, stated,
"However, an unsuccessful appeal which has some merit is
not frivolous."
The Appellant/Respondent herein, in its Appellate Memorandum, set forth a
littney of cases and rulings which appellant contends reasonably supported its
assertion that the trial Court erred in denying the Motion to Set Aside Default. The
appeal to this Court is properly taken based upon the existing law of the State of Utah
and a good faith argument to extend that law. In so filing its appeal, the Appellant
specifically has complied with Rule 33.
Appellant/Respondent cites the case of Darrinaton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452
(Utah App. 1992) apparently for the purpose of asserting that because the Appellant
was involved in another case involving a Motion to set Aside a Judgment, which
motion was filed not by Wade but by Plaintiff establishes a pattern and practice with
the Appellant. That case is differentiated from the case at bar for the reason that the
issues were different the attorney representing Mr. Wade in that proceeding was
different and the facts were different. Appellee's assertion that Mr. Wade has delayed
these proceedings throughout the trial process belies the facts. It was Mr. Wade who
filed not just one, but two Certifications of Readiness of Trial, and had pushed this
case to the setting of a trial date. Mr. Wade had at all times after the setting aside

5

of the initial Default Judgment moved for an early and expeditious trial on the merits,
believing that not only the facts but the existing case law supported his position.
(Certificates of Readiness of Trial, Exhibits A and B.)
II.

THE APPELLEE/PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24A(9) OF
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Rule 24A(9) requires that,
"An argument shall contain contentions and reasons of
Appellant with respect to issues presented with citations to
authority, statutes and parts of record relied upon."
The Appellee, in its Motion for Summary Disposition, merely asserts his opinion

that the Appellant was not entitled to appeal the trial Court's denial of Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside Default, but fails to cite either case law or facts in the record to
support such an assertion. Instead, Appellee choose to factually misstate the Trial
Court record, alleging that the Trial Court awarded fees on this issue. The appeal by
Appellant is not of the Court's Default Order, but of the Trial Court's denial of the
Motion to Set Aside that default. The Trial Court specifically found that the filing of
the 60b Motion was proper, both in time and in substance, and that the arguments
raised by counsel had merit, and on that basis refused to award the Appellee his
requested costs and fees from which the Appellee has appealed. (Notice of Appeal,
Exhibit C)

This Court, when dealing with a similar request in the case of Hinckley

v. Hinckley, 81 5 P.2d 1352, denied the request of Appellee that she be awarded her
costs and fees, she alleged she was entitled to under Rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, when it found,

6

"However, her brief contains only one sentence regarding
attorneys fees and costs, without citations to the record,
no legal authorities, and no analysis whatsoever... A mere
request in the brief, or assertion by counsel at hearing does
not satisfy this requirement."
This Court concluded that,
"Due to the non-compliance with our briefing rule, we
decline to address this issue[.]"
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 81 5 P.2d 1352; 167 Utah Adv. Rept.

16
English v. Standard Optical, 164 Utah Adv. Rept. 41 at 44,
(Utah App. 1991)
In the case at hand, the Appellee/Petitioner, in a single paragraph makes a bare
demand that he is entitled to an award of costs and fees without citation or authority,
or facts supported by the record. The unsupported, unfounded and factually wrong
assertions include:
"A.

The Appellant failed to file an Answer to a properly
served Complaint and Summons."

The Court's record will reflect that an Answer has been filed in this case.
"B.

That there was a meritless attempt to set aside the
Judgment."

The Trial Court found that the filing of the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was
properly filed by the Appellant and there was merit to the arguments raised by the
Appellant. It was upon this foundation that the Trial Court denied Appellee's request
for costs and fees and that the Appellant had delayed the trial proceedings. The fact
is, Appellant/Respondent herein was the party who certified the matter ready for trial
and aggressively sought a trial on the merits. Appellant did fail to appear at trial for

7

the reason that both the Appellant and his counsel mistakenly believed the trial had
been continued.
III.

APPELLEE ASSERTS THAT A WRITTEN CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES, AND THAT THE CONTRACT SUPPORTS AN AWARD OF FEES.
The Appellee, throughout the period of discovery in all pleadings, at the time

of trial, and in post-trial motions has consistently asserted that the contract between
the parties was an oral contract. The Appellee, in its Substitute Memorandum in
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default (Exhibit D), which Appellee was
required to file in order to correct false and misleading statements of material fact
which had been asserted in the original Memorandum
Agreement was oral.

continued to claim the

In fact, the Appellee, in the Substitute Memorandum's

Statement of Facts which was filed in January of 1994 (Exhibit E), specifically states:
"That in or about July of 1989, Defendants engaged
Plaintiff as their agent to attempt to obtain a reduction in
real property tax liability assessed against a large apartment
complex consisting of 108 units owned by the Defendants
and located at approximately 2351 East 6895 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
Paragraph 7
That the engagement was an oral agreement whereby
Defendants agreed to only pay Plaintiff in the event that
Plaintiff was successful in reducing the tax liability for the
property in question..."
Paragraph 8
Appellee now asserts the existence of a written contract which Appellee asserts
entitles him to an award of costs and fees. The record will reflect that this dispute
and involved an alleged contract for the reduction of property taxes on the property
8

is located at 2351 East 6895 South in Salt Lake City.

(Plaintiff's Complaint,

paragraphs 5 and 6, and Statement of Facts, Exhibit F, Paragraph 7.)
There is no dispute that the parties had in the past contracted between
themselves for services relating to a reduction in property taxes on other parcels of
property. The Appellant contends, however, that there is not, and was not, a contract
or agreement on the property located at 2351 East 6895 South, which is the subject
of this suit. The contract which Appellee attaches to its Petition for Rehearing is on
its face for properties other than the property which is the subject of this suit.
Although the copy of the contract attached to the copy of the Appellee's petition
delivered to Appellant is not the clearest of copies, appears to identify subject
properties at 2335 East 7000 South and 261 South 800 East in Salt Lake City, Utah
(Exhibit G). Neither property corresponds to the address of the property which is set
forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. The assertion by the Appellee that this contract is for
the property which is the subject of this suit is fallacious and operates as a fraud upon
the Court.
CONCLUSION
The Appellee has failed to establish a legal or factual basis for the awarding of
costs and fees which would support his request for a modification of the
Memorandum Decision to include an award of fees. Specifically,
A.

That Appellee is entitled to an award of fees for the reason that there
was an award of fees at the trial level. The Trial Court specifically

9

denied Appellee's request for costs or fees related to the Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment which is the basis for this appeal.
B.

That the contract which Appellee attaches to its Petition is for t w o
specific and distinct pieces of property, none of which are the subject of
this suit.

C.

That the Appellee has failed to properly brief the issue as required by
Rule 24A(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Appellant is entitled to an award of costs and fees. The Appellee's Request for
Rehearing on the matter of attorneys fees was done pure and simply to increase the
costs of this litigation in the hopes of extracting further remuneration from the
Appellant and is not properly founded upon existing case law, statutes or supported
by the facts, and in and of itself constitutes a violation of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, entitling the Appellant to an award of attorneys fees and
double costs which he has been required to incur in responding and replying to the
Petition for Rehearing.
WHEREFORE, Appellant/Respondent requests that this Court deny the Petition
of Appellee to award fees and double costs, and for an Order sanctioning Appellee for
the filing of the Petition, and awarding the Appellant reasonable fees and costs which
he has been required to return in responding to the frivoJ£ftj^r petition.
DATED this 26th day of September^JL9S4^.

rii_cLS
Utah Court of Appeals

SEP 2 8 1994
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT
Appellee/Petitioner,

vs.

Appeal No. 940339-CA
Trial Court No. 920012860CV

STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B.
WADE,

Priority No. 1 5

Appellants/Respondent.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appellants/Respondent's
Reply to Petition for Rehearing was mailed, via first class mail, to attorney for the
appellee/Petitioner, M. Shane Smith/Douglas R. Short, 311 South State Street, Suite
450, Salt Lake City Utah 84111, on the 27th day of September, 1994.
DATED this 27th day of September, 1994.

/*»•". James I. Watts
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this^3_ day of September, 1994, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Certificate of Service was mailed via first class mail, postage
pre-paid to:
M. Shane Smith
Douglas R. Short
Smith & Hanna
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Exhibit A

JAMES I. WATTS (#4768)
Attorney for Defendants
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 533-8505

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT

CERTIFICATION OF READINESS
FOR TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B.
WADE,

Civil No.

920012860CV

Judge Fuchs

Defendants.

TO THE DISTRICT COURT:
James I. Watts, attorney for Defendants, by his signature
below hereby certifies that in his judgment this case is ready for
trial and in support of such certification counsel represents to
the Court as follows:
1.

That all required pleadings have been filed and the case

is at issue as to all parties.
i

2.

That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing

, counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that all
i

I! discovery of record has been completed.

3.

That if medical testimony is contemplated or required,

copies of all existing medical reports have been available to all
counsel or parties of record.
4.

That there are no Motions that have been filed which

remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made.
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been
pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement has been
affected.

(Such discussions are to be realistic in nature and not

limited to an unresponded to offer.

The duty to affectively

negotiate lies with all parties.)
6.

Request is hereby made that this matter be set for the

earliest possible trial date.
Counsel further certifies that the following counsel or pro se
parties of record were furnished with a copy of this Certificate on
the

/ "3

day of August, 1993 whose last known addresses and

telephone numbers are as follows:
NAME
Charles Hanna

ADDRESS
Smith & H^nna
175 E^WOO S
Salt ^Lake Ci
Wai
fney for defendants
124 So. 600 E., Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-8505

NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
Any objections to the above certification or any disagreement to
any of the matters to certified are to filed in writing with the
Court within ten (10) days of the date hereof, served upon all
parties, and will be heard at the scheduling conference.
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Exhibit B
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JAMES I. WATTS (#4768)
Attorney for Defendants
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 533-8505

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

1

ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT

|i

Plaintiff,

''

AMENDED CERTIFICATION OF
READINESS FOR TRIAL

vs.
Civil No.

, STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B.
,! WADE,

920012860CV

Judge Fuchs

Defendants.

TO THE DISTRICT COURT:
James I. Watts, attorney for Defendants, by his signature
below hereby certifies that in his judgment this case is ready for
trial and in support of such certification counsel represents to
the Court as follows:
1.

That all required pleadings have been filed and the case

is at issue as to all parties.
2.

That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing

counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that all
discovery of record has been completed.

3.

That if medical testimony is contemplated or required,

copies of all existing medical reports have been available to all
counsel or parties of record.
4.

That there are no Motions that have been filed which

remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made.
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been
pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement has been
affected.

(Such discussions are to be realistic in nature and not

limited to an unresponded to offer.

The duty to affectively

negotiate lies with all parties.)
6.

Request is hereby made that this matter be set for the

earliest possible trial date.
Counsel further certifies that the following counsel or pro se
parties of record were furnished with a copy of this Certificate on
^

the

Z^

day of August, 1993 whose last known addresses and

telephone numbers are as follows:
NAME
Charles Hanna

PHONE

ADDRESS
Smith & Hanna
311 So. Stats #45

52

S a l t Lc^ee >efity f U^ah g * H l
^Watts
:or Dei
5b. 600 E . , / S u i t e 100
felt Lake C i t y , UT 84102
? e l e p h o n e : (801) 5 3 3 - 8 5 0 5

NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
j

Any objections to the above certification or any disagreement to

i

any of the matters to certified are to filed in writing with the
1

Court within ten (10) days of the date hereof, served upon all
parties, and will be heard at the scheduling conference.

Exhibit C

M. Shane Smith (3007)
Douglas R. Short (5344)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South state Street, Suite 450
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-8900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil NO.920012860CV
Judge Fuchs

STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE,
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant,
Robert Mabey, by and through his attorneys, M. Shane Smith and
Douglas R. Short of Smith & Hanna, P.C, appeals to the Utah Court
of Appeals the final judgment of the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs
entered in this matter on June 6, 1994.
The appeal is taken from that portion of the judgment
denying plaintiff/appellant an award of attorney's fees.
DATED this f

day of July, 1994.
SMITH & HANNA

IS R.
Attdrney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify on the

^

day of July, 1994, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed first
class, postage pre-paid, to the following;
James I. Watts
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

IISSWOTA*U>M
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Exhibit D

Charles W. Hanna (1326)
M. Shane Smith (3007)
Douglas R. Short (5344)
SMITH Sc HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-8900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

vs.
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE,

Civil NO.920012860CV
Judge Fuchs

Defendants.
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Robert Mabey, by and through his
attorneys, M. Shane Smith of Smith & Hanna, P.C., and hereby
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Stay of Execution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is defendants' second attempt to set aside a

judgment in this matter, the first having been a default previously
entered by this Court and subsequently set aside.
2.

The present judgment was entered by this Court on

November 3, 1993, after this matter came before the Court at the
time regularly set for trial on the 3rd of November, 1993, at the
hour of 9:30 a.m., before the Honorable Dennis Fuchs, Judge,
Plaintiff being present and represented by counsel, M. Shane Smith

of Smith & Hanna, Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade,
failing to appear and no one appearing as counsel, the Court having1
waited in excess of 15 minutes for Defendants' appearance and
noting that notice had been delivered to James I. Watts, attorney
of record, of the date, time and place set for trial, the Court
having reviewed the file and record in this matter and good cause
appearing therefore, ordered that defendants' answer be stricken
and judgment was entered against defendants, and each of them, in
favor of plaintiff, in the amount of $2,462.15, together with said
plaintiff's costs and disbursements in the amount of $134.00, plus
interest prior to judgment at the rate of ten percent (10%) in the
amount of $1,165.71;

further that attorney's fees be awarded to

plaintiff in the total amount of $2405.86, and that the total
amount of the judgment is and shall be $6033.72.

It was further

ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit, and that pursuant to Section 15-1-4, Utah Code Anno.,
1953, as amended, interest accrue after judgment in the amount of
two points over the federal post judgment interest rate.
3.

Defendants now seek to set aside the November 3,

1993 judgment, claiming mistake or excusable neglect arising from
counsel's claim that he directed his temporary secretary to enter
motions

for

continuance

in

two

separate

cases

with

similar

captions, and the secretary purportedly placed the wrong caption on
the motion for the instant case and sent it to the wrong court and
- 2-

the wrong attorney.
4.

Counsel for defendants never contacted plaintiff's

counsel in this case to give notice of the motion, or to seek a
continuance, or to follow up on the motion for continuance.

See

affidavit of M. Shane Smith.
5.

Counsel for defendants never contacted James Lund,

counsel for defendants Doug and Bruce Mabey in the case where the
motion was mistakenly

filed, to request a continuance or to

schedule another trial date.
6.

As to the factual background of this case, plaintiff

incorporates the facts set forth in plaintiff's original Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants' first Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment.
7.

In or about July 1989, defendants engaged plaintiff

as their agent to attempt to obtain a reduction in real property
tax liability assessed against a large apartment complex consisting
of 108 units owned by defendants, and located at approximately 2351
East 6895 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Affidavit of Robert Mabey
filed with the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Renewed Motion To Set Aside Judgment as Exhibit "A" (hereinafter
"Mabey Affidavit"), at paragraph 2.
8.

The

engagement

was

an

oral

agreement

whereby

defendants agreed to only pay plaintiff in the event that plaintiff
was successful in reducing the tax liability for the property in
question, and to the extent successful, defendants agreed to pay to
plaintiff one-half (1/2) of all reduction in tax liability for the
- 3-

first year of savings. (Mabey Affidavit, 3.)
9.

Plaintiff did obtain a hearing before the Salt Lake

County Board of Equalization and was successful in obtaining a
reduction in the assessed property tax which resulted in a savings
to defendants for tax year 1989 in the amount of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred

Twenty-Four

and

30/100

Dollars

($4,924.30).

(Mabey

Affidavit at 5.)
10.

Defendants had entered into a separate agreement on

a separate piece of property which, although the work was of a
similar nature, the appeal was separate and distinct from the
present matter. Plaintiff had already been successful in obtaining
a reduction in tax liability in that separate appeal involving the
other piece of property.
11.

(Mabey Affidavit at 8.)

As in the present case, defendants accepted the

benefit of plaintiff's work but denied any contractual obligation
to pay the one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings to plaintiff
as agreed.

Plaintiff was forced to bring suit to obtain the funds

owed, which suit was successful.

After trial to the bench (Judge

McCleve), defendants were ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of
one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings obtain on that separate
property.

(See Mabey v. Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade. Civil

No. 913007821CV, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake
City Department.)
12.

In the prior case, the Court expressly found that

Mabey had entered into an oral contract to attempt to effect a
reduction of property taxes on the specific single piece of
- 4-

property known as the Del Monico apartments.

(See Judge McCleve's

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment attached hereto
as Exhibit "B" (hereinafter "McCleve Findings") at paragraph 1 of
the Findings.)
13.

The oral contract between defendants and plaintiff

in the prior case was expressly found to be limited to the Del
Monico property. (McCleve Findings at paragraph 1.)
14.

In the prior case, Judge McCleve expressly found

that defendant's, Stanley Wade, claim concerning the reduction in
tax liability had been accomplished by himself to not be credible
in that defendant, Stanley Wade, was ignorant not only of the
procedure necessary to pursue a reduction in real property tax, but
he did not even know which agency heard such claims. (McCleve
Findings at paragraph 5.)

ARGUMENT
I.

Defendants neglect was not excusable.
There was no mistake in this case. Defense counsel had

clear notice as to when the trial was scheduled. The only question
is whether counsel's clear negligence in failing to properly file
the motion for continuance was excusable.
The burden is on defendants to show why their neglect was
excusable, and yet, they present absolutely no argument for why the
negligence should be excused. They only explain how the negligent
filing occurred.
A motion for continuance, standing alone, does not
- 5-

continue a trial date.

At best, it merely serves notice that

counsel would not be at trial.

For counsel to merely assume that

a trial date will be continued without even attempting to contact
the court to confirm the continuance, or attempting to contact
opposing counsel to obtain an agreement to continue, is not
excusable.
Defense counsel had notice of the trial date, and his
personal conflict therewith, for almost a month before he left the
country, and yet he made absolutely no attempt to contact opposing
counsel to arrange a continuance.

Such a contact would have

required a minimal amount of effort.
delegated to a staff person.

It could have even been

Had such an effort been made, the

error in the filing would have been detected and the nonappearance
could have been avoided.
The unavailability of defendants' counsel was not an
emergency or a surprise. Defendants' counsel knew for over a year
that he would not be available from October 17th to November 7th.
The whole conflict could have therefore been avoided had defense
counsel simply noted in the certificate of readiness for trial that
he would be unavailable during the period he would be out of the
country.

Counsel made no such effort.

Since defense counsel did

not take even the most minimal amount of effort to ensure that the
trial would be continued, his subsequent negligence in filing his
motion with the wrong court and the wrong opposing counsel should
not be excused.
This is the second judgment that plaintiff has obtained
- 6-

against the defendants due to defendants lack of diligence in
defending this matter.

Plaintiff should no longer be required to

suffer for defendants misconduct.

II.

Defendants
have not
meritorious defense.
A.

established

a

credible

Defendants have waived any claim
that the doctrine of res judicata
precludes this action.

Res Judicata is an affirmative defense which must be
raised in a defendant's answer or be waived.
Procedure 8(c), and 12(h).

Utah Rules of Civil

Defendants in this case did not raise

the defense of res judicata in their Answer and are therefore
barred from raising it at this time. Res judicata therefore is not
a meritorious defense.
B.

Defendants' claim that the doctrine
of res judicata acts to preclude
this action is not well founded.

Even if res judicata is not considered to be waived, it
does not apply in this case.

In the prior case upon which

defendants rely, Judge McCleve expressly entered a finding that the
contract in question, in the case before her, specifically related
to the Del Monico apartment properties.

The case at bar involves

a completely separate contract for a separate piece of property,
the

Hillside

Apartments.

The

acts

necessary

to

discharge

plaintiffs' obligations to fulfill the terms of the contract
presently before the court are completely separate, and indeed
required a separate filing before the Board of Equalization, and
- 7-

resulted in a separate benefit to defendants.

Judge McCleve

entered specific findings that the property involved was the Del
Monico apartment property. The work done by plaintiff, relative to
the Del Monico apartment property, was separate and apart from the
work done on the Hillside apartment complex property, and indeed
required filing, pursuing and prosecuting a totally separate appeal
before the Board of Equalization. From the McCleve Findings, it is
clear

that

the prior

case was a separate

cause of action.

Consequently, res judicata does not apply as to the separate
contractual claim being raised for the first time in this suit.
Defendants' nevertheless assert that plaintiff is barred
from bringing the present cause of action because it should have
been brought in the first lawsuit.

Since the contracts are

separate, any claim plaintiff had in relation to the subject
property of this case would have been a permissive claim in the
first suit.

Defendants have not presented any law requiring

plaintiff to file both claims in a single suit.
C.

Defendants' claim that no services
were performed with regard to the
subject property of this suit is
without merit.

Defendants assert that plaintiff and defendants did not enter
into a contract whereby plaintiff would appeal defendants' property
valuation.

Defendants assert further that plaintiff performed no

services with regard to the subject property of this suit.

The

appeal filed with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization on the
valuation of the subject property, a copy of which is attached
hereto as exhibit nC,ff clearly identifies Robert Mabey as the party
- 8-

who filed the appeal as the agent of defendants-

It is undisputed

that defendants received the benefit of the appeal filed by
plaintiff

in that their taxes were in fact reduced.

It is

therefore clear that defendants have no meritorious defense on the
merits of plaintiff's claim.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, plaintiff reiterates his position that
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment should be
denied because the neglect was inexcusable, and because defendants
do not have any meritorious defense.
Defendants' motion is meritless and brought in bad faith.
Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests legal fees for defending
against it.
DATED this

day of January, 1994.
SMITH & HANNA

By:
Douglas R. Short
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify on the

day of May, 1993, a true

and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT was mailed first

class, postage pre-paid, to the following:
James I. Watts
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

MSS1MEM0PP1.PA1
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Charles W. Hanna (1326)
M. Shane Smith (3007)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-8900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT MABEY
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 920012860CV
Judge Fuchs

)

:ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COMES NOW the Affiant, Robert Mabey, who first being duly
sworn upon his oath, does depose and state as follows:
1.

Affiant is the Robert Mabey named as the Plaintiff

in the above-entitled matter.
2.

In or about July 1989, Defendants engaged Affiants'

services to attempt to effect a reduction in property tax liability
for a large apartment complex located at approximately 2351 East
6895 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
3.

The terms of the agreement were very simple; Affiant

agreed to use his best efforts to effect a reduction in property
taxes on the property and Defendants agreed to pay Affiant one-half
(1/) of the reduction in tax liability for the year.

Because of

the simple nature of the agreement, it was not reduced to writing.

Affiant did pursue the appropriate steps required to effect such a
reduction.
4.

As agent for the Defendants, Affiant filed the

appropriate documents, obtained the hearing before the Salt Lake
County Board of Equalization, and prepared the documents showing
the value of the property on a capitalization method based on
rental income and property values by use of comparable properties.

5.

Affiant was successful in obtaining a reduction in

tax liability for the year 1989 in the amount of $4,924.30.
Pursuant to the agreement, Affiant is entitled to one-half (1/2) of
that savings, which amount is $2,462.15.
6.

At all times, Defendants were aware of the efforts

of Affiant and at no time did Defendants request Affiant to
discontinue his efforts in pursuing the said reduction in property
taxes on this property.
7.

Defendants did receive the full benefit of the tax

reduction on the property located at 2351 East 6895 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, in the amount of $4,924.30.
8.

At approximately the same time, Defendants engaged

Plaintiff to pursue a reduction in tax liability on a separate
piece of property known as the Del Monico Apartments.

Plaintiff

was successful there also in effecting a reduction in property tax
and liability for which Plaintiff received the full benefit of said
reduction. Defendants were fully aware of Affiant's activities and
efforts

to effect

said

reduction
- 2-

in tax on the Del Monico

Apartments and made no effort to stop Affiant's efforts in pursuing
such reduction in property taxes on said other piece of property.
9.

Further Affiant sayeth not.

DATED this

/ 2- day of March, 1993.

-u-J

Robert Mabey
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
March, 1993

'Zfc

/ 2 r ^ day of

My Commission Expires:
^
Notary PuWic

SHARON J. ORTEGA

NOTARY PUBL]
Salt Lake Cc

364 North 600 VVesc

Sail Lake City, Uteh t r 113

Lty CoirirnisHon Exo.rc^
September 23,1'^JJ

Staidof UtcJs
MSS1AFFMABEYM1

- 3 -

^

Residing/dt/
Utah
(y

~

/

•-. r.

Charles W. Hanna (1326)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8900
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,

)
)

Plaintiff,

F I N D I *jGS OF FACT AND
CONCIrtJSIONS OF LAW

vs.
STANLEY L. WADE AND JANET B.
;I

WADE,

Defendants.

Civil No. 913007821CV
ytfudge Sheila K. McCleve

'

This matter having come on regularly before the Court for
trial on July 17, 1992, the Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, being present
and being represented by his counsel, Charles W. Hanna of Smith &
Hanna, and Defendant, Stanley L. Wade, being present and representing himself, and the Court having heard the evidence in this matter
and the argument presented by both sides, does hereby enter its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about July 1989, Defendants, Stanley L. Wade

and Janet B. Wade, entered into a contract with Robert Mabey doing
business as Pacific Management pursuant to the terms of which
Robert Mabey agreed to attempt to get the Wadesf property taxes on
the Del Monico Apartments reduced and the Wades agreed to pay to

EXHIBIT B

Robert Mabey the sum of one-half (1/2) of the tax savings for the
first year,
2.

Robert Mabey was able to obtain a reduction on the

taxes assessed on the Del Monico Apartments from $10,162.85 to
$7,317.26, a total savings of $2,845.59.
3.

Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Robert Mabey

was entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the total reduction in the
taxes assessed on the Del Monico Apartments.
was $2,845.59.

The total reduction

Robert Mabey was therefore entitled to payment of

the sum of $1,422.79.
4. Robert Mabey invoiced the Defendants, Stanley L. Wade
and Janet B. Wade, for the sum of $1,422.79 but the Wades failed
and refused to pay to Robert Mabey the sum due and owing.
5.

The Court finds in Mr. Wadefs testimony that he was

the individual responsible for the reduction of property taxes on
the Del Monico Apartments is not credible.

Mr. Wade was not even

aware of the procedure necessary to have the property taxes reduced
on the Del Monico Apartments, nor was Mr. Wade aware of specifically what entity had ultimately ruled that the taxes on the Del
Monico Apartments needed to be reduced.
6.

The Court find that in the process initiated by

Robert Mabey to have the property taxes on the Del Monico Apartments reduced, that Mr. Wade became aware through a telephone call
from an individual associated with the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization of Mr. Mabeyfs activities to reduce the taxes.

Mr.

Wade took no action to stop Mr. Mabey from attempting to have the
- 2 -

taxes reduced on the Del Monico Apartments and received the benefit
of such reduction.
7.

Defendant, Stanley Wade, did not prove that he ever

loaned $2,500.00 to Robert Mabey as provided in his Counterclaim.
8.

Stanley Wade did call Robert Mabey and state that he

had overpaid Robert Mabey the sum of $2,500.00 and that he was
willing to treat that overpayment as a loan.

The Court finds,

however, that Mr. Mabey had performed the obligations of his
contract on the Hillside Apartments and become entitled to payment
of the sum of $2,500.00. The fact that Mr. Wade decided to pursue
an additional appeal to the Utah State Tax Commission to see if his
property taxes could be lowered an additional amount, did not
affect the fact that Mr. Mabey became entitled to fifty percent
(50%) of the savings that he had obtained on the Hillside Apartment
property taxes at the level of the Salt Lake County Board of
Equalization•
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In addition to the Conclusions of Law implied in the
Findings of Fact set forth above, the Court finds as follows:
1. Although the Court specifically finds that there was
a contract in this case based upon the testimony, the Court further
finds as a Conclusion of Law that even if a contract did not exist,
that Robert Mabey would be entitled to judgment on his Complaint
based upon the doctrine of quantum meruit.
2.

The Defendants failed to meet the burden of proof

required on the Counterclaim.
- 3 -

3.

Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment on its Complaint

in the principal amount of $1,422.79 together with accrued interest
and court costs.
4. The Defendants' Counterclaim should be dismissed with
prejudice.

'AJ-

DATED this

S-'•^S

f
day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Judge Sheila K. McCleve

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, first class, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this

Yo?

day of July,

1992, to:
Stanley Wade
2159 Parley's Terrace
Salt Lake City, UT 84109

*&&indite
-/
WP51\CWH\FINDFACT.PA1
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Charles W. Hanna (1326)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY L. WADE AND JANET B.
WADE,

Civil No. /913007821CV
Judge Sheila K. McCleve

Defendants.
This matter having come on regularly before the Court for
trial on July 17, 1992, the Plaintiff, Rdbert Mabey, being present
and being represented by his counsel, Cnarles W. Hanna of Smith &
Hanna, and Defendant, Stanley L. Wade, being present and representing himself and Defendant, Janet B. Wade, having failed to appear
and the Court having heard the evidence submitted by the parties
and having heard the argument of counsel for the Plaintiff and
having heard the argument of Mr. Wade and for good cause having
been shown:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reasons of the
premises aforesaid,

it is ordered,

adjudged and decreed that

Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, do recover from Defendants, Stanley L.

Wade and Janet B. Wade, the sum of $1,422.79 together with $230.04
accrued interest and $54.00 court costs.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the
Defendants' Counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Judgment rendered this ^17

aay of July, 1992.

Attest my hand as Clerk and the Seal
of the said Court this
day of
July, 1992.
, Clerk
By

, Deputy Clerk

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, first class, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT, this

J^r?

day of July, 1992, to:

Stanley Wade
2159 Parley's Terrace
Salt Lake City, UT 84109

•y
WP5X\CWH\ JUDGMENT. PA1
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Exhibit E

Charles W. Hanna (1326)
M. Shane Smith (3007)
Douglas R. Short (5344)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 521-8900
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

vs.
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE,

Civil NO.920012860CV
Judge Fuchs

Defendants.
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Robert Mabey, by and through his
attorneys, M. Shane Smith of Smith & Hanna, P.C., and hereby
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Stay of Execution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is defendants' second attempt to set aside a

judgment in this matter, the first having been a default previously
entered by this Court and subsequently set aside.
2.

The present judgment was entered by this Court on

November 3, 1993, after this matter came before the Court at the
time regularly set for trial on the 3rd of November, 1993, at the
hour of 9:30 a.m., before the Honorable Dennis Fuchs, Judge,
Plaintiff being present and represented by counsel, M. Shane Smith

of Smith & Hanna, Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade,
failing to appear and no one appearing as counsel, the Court having
waited in excess of 15 minutes for Defendants' appearance and
noting that notice had been delivered to James I. Watts, attorney
of record, of the date, time and place set for trial, the Court
having reviewed the file and record in this matter and good cause
appearing therefore, ordered that defendants' answer be stricken
and judgment was entered against defendants, and each of them, in
favor of plaintiff, in the amount of $2,462.15, together with said
plaintiff's costs and disbursements in the amount of $134.00, plus
interest prior to judgment at the rate of ten percent (10%) in the
amount of $1,165.71;

further that attorney's fees be awarded to

plaintiff in the total amount of $2405.86, and that the total
amount of the judgment is and shall be $6033.72.

It was further

ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit, and that pursuant to Section 15-1-4, Utah Code Anno.,
1953, as amended, interest accrue after judgment in the amount of
two points over the federal post judgment interest rate.
3.

Defendants now seek to set aside the November 3,

1993 judgment, claiming mistake or excusable neglect arising from
counsel's claim that he directed his temporary secretary to enter
motions

for

continuance

in

two

separate

cases

with

similar

captions, and the secretary purportedly placed the wrong caption on
the motion for the instant case and sent it to the wrong court and
- 2 -

the wrong attorney.
4.

Counsel for defendants never contacted plaintiff's

counsel in this case to give notice of the motion, or to seek a
continuance, or to follow up on the motion for continuance.

See

affidavit of M. Shane Smith.
5.

Counsel for defendants never contacted James Lund,

counsel for defendants Doug and Bruce Mabey in the case where the
motion was mistakenly

filed,

to request a continuance or to

schedule another trial date.
6.

As to the factual background of this case, plaintiff

incorporates the facts set forth in plaintiff's original Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendants' first Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment.
7.

In or about July 1989, defendants engaged plaintiff

as their agent to attempt to obtain a reduction in real property
tax liability assessed against a large apartment complex consisting
of 108 units owned by defendants, and located at approximately 2351
East 6895 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Affidavit of Robert Mabey
filed with the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Renewed Motion To Set Aside Judgment as Exhibit "A" (hereinafter
"Mabey Affidavit"), at paragraph 2.
8.

The

engagement

was

an

oral

agreement

whereby

defendants agreed to only pay plaintiff in the event that plaintiff
was successful in reducing the tax liability for the property in
question, and to the extent successful, defendants agreed to pay to
plaintiff one-half (1/2) of all reduction in tax liability for the
- 3-

first year of savings. (Mabey Affidavit, 3.)
9.

Plaintiff did obtain a hearing before the Salt Lake

County Board of Equalization and was successful in obtaining a
reduction in the assessed property tax which resulted in a savings
to defendants for tax year 1989 in the amount of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred

Twenty-Four

and

30/100

Dollars

($4,924.30).

(Mabey

Affidavit at 5.)
10.

Defendants had entered into a separate agreement on

a separate piece of property which, although the work was of a
similar nature, the appeal was separate and distinct from the
present matter. Plaintiff had already been successful in obtaining
a reduction in tax liability in that separate appeal involving the
other piece of property.
11.

(Mabey Affidavit at 8.)

As in the present case, defendants accepted the

benefit of plaintiff's work but denied any contractual obligation
to pay the one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings to plaintiff
as agreed.

Plaintiff was forced to bring suit to obtain the funds

owed, which suit was successful.

After trial to the bench (Judge

McCleve), defendants were ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of
one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings obtain on that separate
property.

(See Mabey v. Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade. Civil

No. 913007821CV, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake
City Department.)
12.

In the prior case, the Court expressly found that

Mabey had entered into an oral contract to attempt to effect a
reduction of property

taxes on the specific single piece of
- 4 -

Exhibit F

Charles W. Hanna (1326)
SMITH & HANNA, P.C.

(pI^ £ D
'

Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
UMWCFPIQ PM U« 21
3 1 1 S o u t h S t a t e , S u i t e 450
I33t OLr iu
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
, - q v nF M CIRCUIT COURT
Telephone: (801) 521-8900
"sC LAKE Df^MHEnT
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
ROBERT MABEY d / b / a PACIFIC
MANAGEMENT,
COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B.
WADE,

C i v i l No.
Judge

tfwd/Mia/

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, for cause of action against
defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, complains and
alleges as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, is a resident of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, and does business in the State of Utah as
Pacific Management.
2.

Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, are

residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

The contract upon which the within causes of action

are based were entered into and were to have been performed in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Contract
4.

Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 3 as though set forth verbatim herein.
5.

In about July of 1989, defendants, Stanley L. Wade

and Janet B. Wade, entered into a contract with Robert Mabey doing
business as Pacific Management pursuant to the terms of which
Robert Mabey agreed to attempt to get the Wades' property taxes on
certain property located at 2351 East 6895 South in Salt Lake City,
Utah reduced, and the Wades agreed to pay Robert Mabey one-half of
the savings for the first year.
6.

Pacific Management was able to obtain a reduction on

the taxes assessed against the property located at 2351 East 6895
South from $26,375.04 to $21,450.74, a total savings of $4,924.30.
7.

Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Pacific

Management was entitled to 50% of the total savings of $4,924.30 as
payment for its services. Pacific Management is therefore entitled
to $2,462.15.
8. Pacific Management has fully complied with all of its
obligations under the contract and demand has been made upon
defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, for payment of the
sum of $2,462.15, but said defendants have failed and refused to
pay to plaintiff the sum due and owing.

- 2 -

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Quantum Meruit
9.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 as though set forth verbatim
herein.
10.

Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, has provided to defendants

services in reducing their real property taxes, which are the
subject matter of this litigation, which has conferred a reasonable
value upon said defendants.
11.

Plaintiff has acted as alleged herein, with the

expectation of being compensated therefor in an amount equal to the
reasonable

value

of

the

services

provided

by

plaintiff

to

defendants•
12.

Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, owe

to plaintiff, Robert Mabey, the sum of $2,462.15 to compensate
plaintiff

for the fair and reasonable value of the services

provided by plaintiff to defendants.
13.
intermeddler

Plaintiff has not acted as a volunteer or an
in

conducting

himself

as

alleged

herein,

and

defendants at all times have acknowledged the actions of plaintiff
as conferring a substantial benefit upon them with respect to the
services rendered in lowering their property taxes.
14. To permit defendants to retain the benefits received
from plaintiff without compensating plaintiff therefor would result
in the unjust enrichment of defendants at the expense of plaintiff,
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which unjust enrichment should not be countenanced by a court of
equity.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays the above entitled Court for
judgment as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Contract
1.

That plaintiff, Robert Mabey, be awarded a personal

money judgment against defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B.
Wade,

in the

amount of

$2,462.15, together with prejudgment

interest at the legal rate and court costs.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Quantum Meruit
2.

That plaintiff, Robert Mabey, be awarded a personal

money judgment against defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B.
Wade,

in the

amount of

$2,462.15, together with prejudgment

interest at the legal rate and court costs.
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

equitable and just in the premises.
DATED this /O^-

day of September, 1992.

Plaintiff's Address:
2169 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
CWH\COMPLAIN. PA1
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Exhibit G

f^k

CIFIC

MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION

This agreement is made between WPACIFIC MANAGEMENT CORPORATION"
(hereafter PMC) and the Owner/s (hereafter Client) of the property
noted herein. The property to be researched and appealed by PMC.
is located:
(state)

(city)

(property address)

(zip)

The following is agreed by both parties:
1.
Client authorizes PMC to appeal the assessed valuation of
above property before appropriate government entitles. If PMC
determined that It may not be beneficial to appeal the Real
Property taxes of property, PMC at their sole discretion, may elect
not to proceed with the tax appeal.
2.
Client agrees to pay PMC 50* of the first year savings in Real
Property Taxes realized by appeal process. Client agrees to pay
PMC upon written notice of the Tax reduction. Client empowers PMC
or it's officers with limited power of attorney to act in behalf
of client in all matters relating to the property tax appeal,
direction of or disposition of refund, and or collection of any
compensation due PMC.
3.
Client agrees to hold PMC harmless of any action arising out
of association with PMC. Client agrees to provide all requested
documents. In the event of non-payment, Client agrees to pay all
resulting collection cost, court cost and reasonable attorneys
fees.
4.
Client agrees to cooperate and provide any and all'assistance,
information and documentation necessary for PMC to complete the tax
appeal process, including copies of 1989 NOTICE OF PROPERTY
VALUATION AND TAX CHANGE and CLOSING STATEMENT if property was
purchased within the last year, and to complete the following
section as it may apply by filling out the following: (please
print)
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PACIFIC MANAGEMENT

T7"

<*— '-•'. '?:"••
DATE'

s/'»-rr*

}*/**/*

. OWNER SIGNATURE
OWNER
CITY
AREA

APPROX. DATS PURCHASED
•stt^/*»» \ ^»-

DATE

STATE

ZIP

TELEPHONE

